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We have been here before. In psychology 
and philosophy, character traits have been 
invoked time and again to argue that people 
should be disposed to behave consistently 
across a wide range of trait-relevant sce-
narios. Take moral behavior. In frameworks 
ranging from Aristotelian moral psychol-
ogy, virtue ethics, and Kohlberg’s (1984) 
developmental stage theory of moral rea-
soning to contemporary economic theories 
of fairness (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), 
the same premise applies: The virtues, traits, 
and social preferences a person possesses 
and the developmental stages she has passed 
through supposedly imply consistency in 
how she will behave in morally relevant situ-
ations (see Doris, 2002). But it just isn’t so.
Seemingly inconsequential situational 
changes can give rise to consequential 
behavioral inconsistencies. In a classic study 
by Darley and Batson (1973), for instance, 
students at the Princeton Theological 
Seminary – whose current mission state-
ment lists “compassion” among its training 
objectives – failed to show exactly this qual-
ity in the face of a minor contextual change. 
The experiment required students to walk 
from one building to another. On the way, 
and believing that they were running late, 
merely 10% of the students offered help to a 
(confederate) person slumped in a doorway. 
When time was of little concern, however, 
63% of them did so. This inconsistency in 
compassionate behavior is striking given 
the seemingly minor situational change. 
Although examples of such inconsisten-
cies abound (Fleischhut and Gigerenzer, in 
press), the notion of stable virtues remains 
“deeply compelling” to most of us – not-
withstanding the fact that “much of this lore 
rests on psychological theory that is some 
2,500 years old” (Doris, 2002, p. ix).
The lore of stable and domain-general 
risk preferences arose in the twentieth 
century (for a canonical reference, see 
Samuelson, 1938), and it is at least as seduc-
tive as theories of robust and context-invar-
iant moral traits and virtues. Without the 
assumption of stable preferences standard 
utility models in many fields of econom-
ics simply would not work. Yet evidence 
against this assumption has been mount-
ing for decades (see Friedman and Sunder, 
2011). Let us give just two recent examples. 
Contrary to expected utility theory, Tversky 
and Kahneman (1992) and Tversky and Fox 
(1995) showed that, depending on domain 
(loss versus gain) and probability (low 
versus high), people behave in both a risk-
averse and a risk-seeking way. Specifically, 
they are risk-averse when the probability 
of winning is high but risk-seeking when 
it is low. In the loss domain, in contrast, 
people are risk-averse when the probability 
of losing is low but risk-seeking when it 
is high (Table 1). This “fourfold pattern” 
runs counter to the assumption of risk aver-
sion as a domain-general trait. It has been 
shown to arise in decisions from description 
(Hertwig et al., 2004), where – as is com-
mon in choices between monetary gam-
bles such as those used by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) – people are able to peruse 
descriptions of probability and outcome 
distributions. Outside the laboratory, how-
ever, outcomes and probabilities are rarely 
known with certainty and served up to the 
decision-maker on a platter. Consequently, 
people must often choose between options 
without having a convenient description of 
possible choice outcomes, let alone their 
probabilities. One strategy for overcoming 
such uncertainty is to sample the payoff 
distributions to learn about the options’ 
attractiveness and, based on the experi-
enced information, to come to a decision. 
In such decisions from experience (Hertwig 
and Erev, 2009) the fourfold pattern is 
reversed (Table 1; see also Hertwig, 2011). 
In other words, inferred risk preferences 
vary as a function of the mode of  decision 
 making (description versus experience) as 
well as domain (gain versus loss) and prob-
ability (low versus high).
Instability in risk preferences has also 
been found in real-world data. Starting with 
the assumption that people are expected 
utility maximizers, Barseghyan et al. (2011) 
examined whether the choice of insurance 
cover in a sample of U.S. households can be 
modeled by the same coefficient of abso-
lute risk aversion. It could not. Households’ 
inferred risk preferences proved to be unsta-
ble across highly related decision contexts, 
differing not only between auto insurance 
and home insurance but also between two 
different types of auto insurance (collision 
versus comprehensive).
How to model inconsistencies in 
beHavior
Perhaps the most common response to 
these demonstrations of unstable risk pref-
erences has been to increase the flexibility 
of expected utility theory while retaining its 
original scaffolding. Flexibility comes in the 
form of additional adjustable parameters. To 
take one prominent example, cumulative 
prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992) has five adjustable parameters, which 
allow both for separate value functions 
for losses and gains and for a probability-
weighting function to accommodate the 
fourfold pattern. In this approach, any fur-
ther inconsistencies in risk preferences (e.g., 
Barseghyan et al., 2011) would require addi-
tional adjustable parameters – for instance, a 
parameter that accommodates risk aversion 
as a function of different insurance domains. 
Similar attempts to “repair” expected util-
ity theory (Selten, 2001) in light of contrary 
evidence include introducing error terms 
into utility models (e.g., Hey and Orme, 
1994) and assuming stochastic prefer-
ences (e.g., the random preference model; 
Loomes and Sugden, 1995). The problems 
with this approach have become obvious. 
Parameterized repair models, which already 
assume complex computations, become 
even more opaque as-if models that cannot 
describe the underlying decision process.
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Without resorting to non-linear trans-
formations of quantities or to other adjust-
able parameters, the priority heuristic can 
correctly predict the entire fourfold pat-
tern of risk preferences in decisions from 
description and in fact logically implies it 
(Katsikopoulos and Gigerenzer, 2008). The 
key to its predictive power is the sequen-
tial activation of several classic heuristics. 
Specifically, in the domain of gains, the 
heuristic’s first consideration is the only 
one examined by the minimax heuristic, 
which embodies risk aversion through its 
policy of always selecting the option with 
the highest minimum payoff. Unlike mini-
max, however, the priority heuristic bases 
its choice on the minimum outcomes only 
when the difference between them exceeds 
an aspiration level. If this aspiration level 
is not reached, then only the second con-
sideration, the probability of the minimum 
outcome, is attended to. This considera-
tion captures the policy of the least likely 
heuristic, which embodies risk aversion by 
identifying each gamble’s worst outcome 
and selecting the gamble with the lowest 
probability of leading to the lowest payoff. 
Again, the priority heuristic takes advan-
tage of an aspiration level to “evaluate” 
whether this policy is reasonable. If not, it 
shifts gears and consults the last considera-
tion, the maximum outcomes. This is the 
home turf of the maximax heuristic, which 
chooses the gamble with the highest mon-
etary payoff, thus implementing uncondi-
tional risk-seeking.
The priority heuristic thus integrates 
three classic heuristics into one and works 
through them sequentially. As a result, it 
can produce risk-averse or risk-seeking 
choices, depending on the number of 
considerations that a particular choice 
problem requires the heuristic to exam-
ine. Moreover, depending on the specific 
sequence of successive choice problems, a 
user of the heuristic may seem to act risk-
averse one minute and risk-seeking the 
next only to switch back to what appears 
to be aversion again. This pattern of behav-
ior does not reflect unstable risk prefer-
ences, however, but rather follows directly 
from the interaction of the heuristic’s 
architecture with the choice environ-
ment. Admittedly, one could still defend 
the notion of a general risk disposition by 
arguing that risk-averse or risk-seeking 
people choose different heuristics from 
examination if probabilities differ by 1/10 
(or more) of the probability scale.
Decision rule. Choose the gamble with 
the more attractive gain (probability). 
The more attractive gamble is that with 
the higher (minimum or maximum) gain 
and the lower probability of leading to the 
minimum gain.
To demonstrate how the heuristic works, 
let us return to the fourfold pattern. Table 1 
(left panel) reports certainty equivalents 
C, which represent the amount of money 
for which a person proves to be indiffer-
ent between a risky gamble and the certain 
amount C. Consider, for instance, the upper-
left cell. The median C of $14 exceeds the 
expected value of the risky gamble ($5,100 
with a probability of 5%). People are thus 
interpreted to be risk-seeking because of 
their preference for the risky gamble over 
the sure gain of $5. This information thus 
lends itself to the construction of choice 
problems such as the following:
A: 100 with p = 0.05
 0 with p = 0.95
B: 5 with p = 1
To predict the majority choice in this 
gamble, the priority heuristic starts by 
comparing the minimum gains (0 and 5). 
The difference in the minimum gain, $5, 
does not reach the aspiration level of 10 
(1/10 of 100) and so fails to discriminate 
between the options. Consequently, the 
probabilities of the minimum gains are 
examined next. These do not discriminate 
either (1.0–0.95 < 0.10). Therefore, the heu-
ristic turns to the maximum gains (100 and 
5) and predicts that the option that offers 
the higher gain (the risky option) is chosen. 
This choice, which accords with the cer-
tainty equivalent of $14 (Table 1), implies 
risk-seeking.
It is time to move out of this theoretical 
cul-de-sac. The alternative we propose is to 
replace the concept of preferences by that 
of heuristics or, more generally, of cognitive 
strategies that give rise to diverse behavioral 
patterns. By “heuristic” we mean a strategy 
that ignores part of the information in 
order to make decisions faster and more 
accurately (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 
2011). Although inconsistent behavior 
presents a problem for the notion of stable 
preferences, for the framework of heuris-
tics it does not. On the contrary, heuristics 
imply what looks like inconsistent behav-
ior and can even predict when it will occur. 
A person who consistently relies on the 
same heuristic can behave in a seemingly 
inconsistent way. The inconsistency does 
not reside, however, in the person; it arises 
from looking at behavior through the lenses 
of a theory that assumes stable preferences.
How lexicograpHic Heuristics 
imply inconsistencies
Heuristics enable one to model choices 
indicative of inconsistent risk preferences in 
terms of the sequential processing steps and 
the interactions between the heuristic and 
the choice environment. For illustration, 
consider the priority heuristic (Brandstätter 
et al., 2006, 2008), which belongs to the class 
of lexicographic rules. The heuristic is com-
posed of the following steps (for generaliza-
tion to loss gambles and multiple outcomes, 
see Brandstätter et al., 2006):
Search rule. Go through the considera-
tions in the following order: minimum 
gain, probability of minimum gain, maxi-
mum gain.
Stopping rule. Stop examination if the 
minimum gains differ by 1/10 (or more) 
of the maximum gain; otherwise, stop 
Table 1 | Fourfold pattern in decisions from description and reversed pattern in decisions from 
experience (Hertwig, 2011).
Description Experience
Probability Gain Loss Gain Loss
Low C(100,0.05)a = 
14, risk-seeking
C(−100,0.05) = 
−8, risk aversion
32, 0.1 versus 3, 1.0, 
Risk aversion (20%b)
−32, 0.1 versus −3, 1.0, 
Risk-seeking (72%)
High C(100,0.95) = 78, 
risk aversion
C(−100,0.95) = 
−84, risk-seeking
4, 0.8 versus 3, 1.0, 
Risk-seeking (88%)
−4, 0.8 versus −3, 1.0, 
Risk aversion (44%)
aC(100,0.05) represents the median certainty equivalent for the gamble to pay $100 with probability p = 0.05, 
otherwise nothing (based on Tversky and Fox, 1995).
bChoice proportions refer to the percentage of choices of the risky option in each pair of gambles (based on 
Hertwig et al., 2004; Hertwig, 2011).
Hertwig and Gigerenzer How heuristics imply behavioral inconsistencies
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition  November 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 292 | 2
Sets (June 6, 2011). Yale Economics Department 
Working Paper. Available at: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1858769
Gigerenzer, G., and Gaissmaier, W. (2011). Heuristic deci-
sion making. Ann. Rev. Psychol. 62, 451–482.
Gonzalez, C., and Dutt, V. (2011). Instance-based learn-
ing: integrating sampling and repeated decisions from 
experience. Psychol. Rev. 118, 523–551.
Hertwig, R. (2011). The psychology and rationality of 
decisions from experience. Synthese. doi: 10.1007/
s11229-011-0024-4
Hertwig, R., Barron, G., Weber, E. U., and Erev, I. (2004). 
Decisions from experience and the effect of rare events 
in risky choice. Psychol. Sci.15, 534–539.
Hertwig, R., Davis, J. N., and Sulloway, F. J. (2002). 
Parental investment: how an equity motive can pro-
duce inequality. Psychol. Bull.128, 728–745.
Hertwig, R., and Erev, I. (2009). The description-experi-
ence gap in risky choice. Trends Cogn. Sci. 13, 517–523.
Hey, J. D., and Orme, C. (1994). Investigating generaliza-
tions of expected utility theory using experimental 
data. Econometrica 62, 1291–1326.
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: 
an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47, 
263–292.
Katsikopoulos, K. V., and Gigerenzer, G. (2008). One-
reason decision-making: Modeling violations of 
expected utility theory. J. Risk Uncertain. 37, 35–56.
Kohlberg, L. (1984). Essays in Moral Development: The 
Psychology of Moral Development, Vol. 2. New York: 
Harper & Row.
Loomes, G., and Sugden, R. (1995). Incorporating a 
stochastic element into decision theories. Eur. Econ. 
Rev. 39, 641–648.
Samuelson, P. (1938). A note on the pure theory of con-
sumers’ behaviour. Economica 5, 61–71.
Selten, R. (2001). “What is bounded rationality?” in 
Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox, eds G. 
Gigerenzer and R. Selten (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press), 13–36.
Tversky, A., and Fox, C. R. (1995). Weighing risk and 
uncertainty. Psychol. Rev. 102, 269–283.
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in pros-
pect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty. 
J. Risk Uncertain. 5, 297–232.
Received: 01 July 2011; accepted: 11 October 2011; published 
online: 15 November 2011.
Citation: Hertwig R and Gigerenzer G (2011) Behavioral 
inconsistencies do not imply inconsistent strategies. Front. 
Psychology 2:292. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00292
This article was submitted to Frontiers in Cognition, a 
specialty of Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2011 Hertwig and Gigerenzer. This is an 
open-access article subject to a non-exclusive license 
between the authors and Frontiers Media SA, which 
permits use, distribution and reproduction in other 
forums, provided the original authors and source are 
credited and other Frontiers conditions are complied 
with.
default) and the heuristic (which accepts 
the default; Fleischhut and Gigerenzer, in 
press).
conclusion
Inconsistencies in observed behavior 
have been interpreted as conflicting with 
assumed stable preferences or traits. 
According to our analysis, the problem 
lies not in the inconsistent behavior but 
in the assumed existence of preferences, 
whether stable, probabilistic, or of another 
kind. We show that a theoretical analysis 
that explains behavior as a function of 
heuristics’ interactions with the environ-
ment can do more than describe seeming 
behavioral inconsistencies post hoc; it can 
predict precisely when such inconsisten-
cies will occur.
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their adaptive toolbox. But if that were 
true, then risk-averse people should con-
sistently use minimax and risk-prone peo-
ple maximax – not the priority heuristic. 
The evidence does not support this con-
jecture (Brandstätter et al., 2006). Finally, 
note that the priority heuristic, like any 
heuristic, is not a domain-general strategy. 
It operates on explicitly stated (described) 
probabilities, and thus cannot explain the 
reversed fourfold pattern in decisions from 
experience (Table 1; for a psychological 
account of this class of decisions see, for 
instance, Gonzalez and Dutt, 2011).
How Heuristics in tHe social 
world imply beHavioral 
inconsistencies
The interaction between a heuristic and 
the environment may also be the key 
to understanding apparent behavioral 
inconsistencies in morally relevant situa-
tions. For illustration, consider the equity 
heuristic (Hertwig et al., 2002), according 
to which parents divide their resources 
among their n children equally in any given 
investment interval. The heuristic can pro-
duce both equal and unequal cumulative 
distributions of parental resources and 
thus a fairer or less fair outcome. It does 
not, however, create both equality and ine-
quality through inconsistent preferences. 
Instead, depending on the environment – 
specifically, the number of children, their 
birth order, and the size of interbirth inter-
vals – the equity heuristic implies equal or 
unequal investments across children. The 
case of organ donation illustrates how 
another simple strategy, the default heu-
ristic, can produce predominantly altru-
istic behavior in “opt-out” countries such 
as France and Austria and predominantly 
non-altruistic behavior in Germany and 
the Netherlands, where people must “opt 
in” to be donors. Again, the drastically dif-
ferent hypothetical organ donation rates 
are not a reflection of inconsistent pref-
erences or traits in neighboring societies 
but rather the product of the interaction 
between an environment (here, the legal 
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